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Abstract 
 
Efforts to resolve interstate disputes are often characterized by repeated engagement 
and evolving strategies. What explains a state’s decision to continue conflict resolution 
efforts but escalate their management strategy? Drawing from foreign policy literature, I 
argue third parties escalate policies both in response to past failures, shifting conflict 
dynamics, and their relationship with the disputants. Analysis of management efforts 
from 1946 to 2001 reveals that the changing nature of the conflict, policy failures and 
relationships between the third party and disputants are integral to understanding the 
management decision process, but the effects of these factors depend on the management 
history. 
 
Keywords: Conflict management, Militarized Interstate Disputes, Mediation, Intervention  
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Management begets management. This is one of the most universal findings in the 
conflict management literature: a history of managing a conflict encourages the same 
state to manage the conflict once again (Greig 2005; Regan and Stam 2000). While third 
parties with previous involvement as a conflict manager are likely to remain involved, it 
is unclear the extent to which their policies and approaches change. What explains a 
state’s decision to remain involved in efforts to resolve a conflict but change their 
strategy of managing the conflict? How can we explain management choices and policy 
escalation? Are third parties responding to past failures, changes in the nature of the 
dispute, or is this decision reflective of a more self-interested process? 
Policy escalation reflects strategic third party management decisions. This paper 
argues that states escalate management strategies as a response to several underlying 
conditions. Most obviously, states may adopt a new management technique in an effort to 
more successfully resolve the conflict. Past strategies may have been ineffective, or 
conflict dynamics may have shifted such that a new approach is more appropriate. 
Conversely, management changes may be reflective of strategic relationships between the 
third party and the disputants, and intervention behavior can reflect state ties rather than 
conflict dynamics. This paper further explores the role these factors play in the conflict 
management process. 
A study of intervention policy dynamics adds several important new dimensions to 
understanding international conflict resolution. First, this represents a first effort to open 
the “black box” of conflict management, analyzing what happens between the start and 
end of third party involvement. Second, I adopt an integrative definition of intervention, 
including various mechanisms of third party conflict management and thereby offering 
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insights about their interplay and sequencing. Finally, as a willingness to try multiple 
intervention techniques reveals information about the third party commitment to 
resolving the conflict, understanding policy changes offers a mechanism of capturing 
third party resolve and commitment to conflict resolution. 
The paper begins with an overview of the literature on which it will build: that on 
foreign policy change, conflict management and mediation. I then offer a theory of when 
third parties are likely to adopt escalatory policies of conflict management and when they 
are likely to remain involved using the same techniques, which draws from the foreign 
policy literature. I argue third parties change policies both in response to past failures and 
shifting conflict dynamics. Changes in policies may also be reflective of the strategic 
relationship between the third party and disputants. Censored probit analysis of 269 
management efforts from 1946 to 2001 reveals that the changing nature of the conflict, 
policy failures and relationships between the third party and disputants are integral to 
understanding the management decision process, but the effects of these factors are 
dependent on the management history. In circumstances following verbal and diplomatic 
attempts, biased states, or those with strong ties to only one of the disputants, are 
significantly more likely to escalate policies regardless of previous outcomes. Following 
strategic non-intervention, however, third party ties to both actors encourage policy 
escalation. These results contribute to and extend the vast literature on bias and conflict 
management. I conclude by highlighting directions for future research. 
THE LITERATURE OF POLICY CHANGE AND MANAGEMENT DECISIONS 
To explain escalations in conflict management policy, this paper seeks to link the 
literatures on foreign policy change, which mostly focuses on the process of US foreign 
	 5	
policy decision-making (Clark 2001, 2, Clark, Nordstrom, and Reed 2008, Clark and 
Reed 2005), and on conflict management, which treats various management techniques 
as distinct events. While policy inertia is present and perhaps even dominant, policy 
changes do occur and are worth exploring (Gustavsson 1998). Policy substitution has 
been shown to occur in the management of both civil (Regan 2000) and international 
(Oswiak 2014) conflict, but it is unclear why states change and escalate policies when 
managing an interstate war.   
Despite a focus on wholesale, comprehensive changes and restructuring (see, for 
example Hermann 1990), the literature on foreign policy change offers important 
theoretical insights into the state policymaking process. I broadly categorize the factors 
highlighted within the foreign policy literature as (1) contextual and (2) intervening 
factors. Contextual factors involve situational conditions, such as Goldmann’s (1988) 
“stabilizers,” which inhibit change even in the presence of pressure for change.2 
Intervening factors are the dynamic events that push for change, such as Hermann’s 
(1990) external shocks and domestic restructuring.3 A combination of contextual factors 
and intervening factors lead to the outcome of policy change (Holsti 1982, Hermann 
1990). I consider these broad theoretical factors as they apply to changes in conflict 
management method. 
Enormous strides have been made within the conflict management literature in 
recent years. Since focusing on management outcomes produces a selection bias (Greig 																																																								
2 These variables, which include thirteen international, cognitive, political and administrative stabilizers, 
affect whether or not sources of change actually set change in motion. 3	Research within the foreign policy decision making literature examines a variety of influential factors, 
including the psychology of leaders, public opinion, bureaucracies, media, special interest groups, 
government structures, political structure and norms all as sources of policy change. As accounting for each 
of the possibly influential mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper, I draw from the theoretical 
contributions this literature makes.  
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2005, Gartner and Bercovitch 2006, Svensson 2006), scholars have begun to understand 
management occurrence and generate a more complete picture of the management 
process.  For example, we know mediation is more likely to occur in international 
rivalries than less intense conflicts (Bercovitch and Diehl 1997) and in international 
disputes characterized by high complexity, high intensity, long duration, and unequal 
parties (Bercovitch and Jackson 2001).  We also know that the characteristics of the 
dispute and the disputants explain mediation occurrence (Greig 2005), and the mediators 
account for their relationship to the disputants (Melin 2011) and ability to transform the 
conflict before acting (i.e. Bercovitch 2002, Touval and Zartman 2001). 
 This paper represents is an attempt to understand the substitutive and iterative 
nature of conflict management. While scholars are beginning to understand third party 
involvement and outcomes, we have little information about what goes on between the 
start and end of such efforts. The first contribution of this project is therefore to examine 
the dynamic nature of third party involvement. Third parties’ strategic selection of 
management policies has important implications for both the characteristics of 
management and its outcomes.  Failing to account for what we know about actors’ 
strategic choice of involvement and method (Melin 2011) and the characteristics of 
disputes that require outside assistance for resolution (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006) 
would introduce selection bias. Addressing variation in third party management 
techniques enables me to account for each of these strategic processes and avoid reaching 
incorrect conclusions due to selection bias (see Fearon 2002). 
I also seek to address another common problem in existing literature.  Most 
conflict management scholarship isolates the outcome of interest as a discrete variable 
	 7	
where a reference category encompasses all behavior other than the outcome of interest 
(Clark, Nordstrom, and Reed 2008).  Other policy alternatives are unspecified and 
aggregated as something other than the outcome of interest. “Mediation” is contrasted 
with “no mediation,” “sanctions” with “no sanctions,” and “peacekeeping” with “no 
peacekeeping.”  Many existing studies examine policies of military intervention (see 
Regan 1996), diplomatic approaches (see Mack and Snyder 1957, Kleiboer 1996, Pruitt 
1981), mediation (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991, Regan and Stam 2000), and 
economic sanctions (Hufbauer and Schott 1983, Li 1993, Weiss 1999) independently of 
one another.4 My second contribution is to integrate these literatures by examining 
strategy iterations. These disparate literatures can and should be united with research on 
other methods of conflict management (see Dixon 1996, Regan 2000, Frazier and Dixon 
2006b, Melin 2011, Beardsley and Lo 2013 for works that consider the interplay of 
substitutable management techniques).  
Finally, this paper offers a mechanism of quantifying intervener commitment. A 
willingness to try multiple intervention techniques reveals information about the third 
party commitment to resolving the conflict, as third parties with a strong desire to 
peacefully resolve a conflict are more willing to employ multiple intervention techniques. 
Third parties that adopt multiple strategies in the same conflict signal interest in the 
conflict and its resolution. Third parties that focus their energy on conflict resolution and 
repeatedly engage the disputants simultaneously build rapport and trust, increasing the 
																																																								
4 While examining these different methods of management jointly is an important step to understanding the 
conflict resolution process, the currently accepted categorizations are admittedly not arbitrary. It is logical 
to examine these actions separately if seeking to understand the occurrence of multilateral efforts. When 
examining such efforts from the supply side, however, creating delimited categories poses serious threats to 
the accumulation of knowledge (Starr 2000). 
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likelihood of effectively resolving the conflict. Engaging committed conflict managers 
will increase the likelihood that they generate a lasting peace agreement.  
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, POLICY CHANGE AND ESCALATION 
Conflict management represents an attempt to do something about reducing, 
limiting or eliminating the level, scope and intensity of violence in conflict and building a 
structure where the need to resort to violence in future conflicts is controlled.5 This paper 
focuses on nonbinding unilateral and multilateral management, examining the conflict 
management process from the third party’s viewpoint.6 I examine changes in 
management tactics among verbal management, administrative support, diplomatic 
efforts, economic sanctions, and peacekeeping rather than singularly focusing on one 
management mechanism (see Table 1 for descriptions of these strategies).  
Scholars adopt varied approaches to defining escalation and change in foreign 
policy.7 In this paper, I adopt Goldmann’s (1988) simple definition as “either a new act in 
a given situation or a given act in a situation previously associated with a different act.” 
This definition is appropriate for examining shifts in management policies since these 
changes are not necessarily reflective of large-scale overhauls of a state’s broader policy 
agenda. Hermann (1990) discusses these as “adjustment” and “program” changes, which 
																																																								
5 This paper does not seek to explain outside parties that join as an additional disputant (see (Singer, 
Bremer, and Stuckey 1972); (Corbetta 2010)) but instead focuses on third parties that act as conflict 
managers.   
6 Broadly speaking, the numerous tools available for conflict prevention, management, and resolution can 
be grouped into three different categories: (i) unilateral, which involve conflict management without the 
consent of the disputants, such as military intervention (ii) bilateral, which involves direct talk between the 
disputants, such as negotiation, and (iii) multilateral, which takes place with the consent and cooperation of 
the disputants, such as mediation or adjudication.  By focusing on unilateral and multilateral efforts, I offer 
a supply side approach to management.  Whether the effort is unilateral or multilateral has important 
implications for the probability that the effort will be successful.   
7 While some scholars focus on a wide reaching shift in a state’s external relations (Deutsch 1973, Maoz 
2004), others have developed extensive typologies that encompass graduated levels of change (Holsti 1982). 
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entail tactical movements in the realization stage of a policy or the methods and means 
used to meet a foreign policy objective. 
I focus on policy escalation as employing more costly management techniques, 
which may involve cessation of initial management method or the use of other tools in 
addition to the initial method. Shifts in management policy can be categorized on the 
basis of variation in the actors and actions.  In the first, what I refer to as conflict-based 
change, similar responses are employed in different conflicts. Thus, the change is in the 
identity of the disputants. Consider the varied uses of mediation as a form of conflict 
management: US mediation of the conflict between Israel and Egypt in the 1970s, the 
Vatican’s mediation in the Falkland conflict between Argentina and the UK in 1982, and 
Congo’s mediation of the conflict between Burundi and Rwanda in 1966. Thus, in 
conflict-based change, the policy employed is the same but the conflict (and possibly, but 
not necessarily, the third party) is different.   
In policy-based change, similar conflicts are managed differently. Consider the 
UN observers originally sent into Yugoslavia in 1992 compared to the later NATO 
military intervention in Kosovo.  As was the case in the international reactions to 
Yugoslavia and Kosovo, change is likely the result of learning.  In policy-based change, 
the policy employed (and perhaps, although not necessarily, the third party) differs 
despite similarities across conflicts. 
Finally, different management techniques are combined with one another in 
management-based change.  George H.W. Bush’s verbal response to Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait, “This will not stand,” was followed with military intervention.  Economic 
sanction, diplomatic efforts, and peacekeeping efforts are substitutable ways of managing 
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a conflict.  Thus, in management-based change, the conflict and third party remain the 
same, but the approach to management differs. 
Since each type of change likely has different causes and often involves different 
actors, creating an understanding of when and why each occurs is beyond the scope of a 
single theory or paper.  This paper therefore focuses on the last policy change type, 
management-based change, which involves the same third party adopting a new 
management policy in a conflict.  More specifically, I examine the direction of these 
changes, or those that constitute policy escalation. Policy escalation involves adopting a 
new, more invasive (and likely costly) conflict management policy, as Table 1 
summarizes. Adopting a strategy to the right of the initial strategy constitutes a policy 
escalation, as the strategies are ordered by the costs the third parties incur (Owsiak 2014).  
***Table 1 Here*** 
***Figure 1 Here*** 
Figure 1 shows the frequency of each initial and follow-up strategy. Less costly 
efforts are common initial strategies when the third party chooses to act at all, as verbal 
(53%) and diplomatic (40%) approaches are employed at a higher rate than economic 
(6%) and peacekeeping operations (1%). By far the most common policy, however, is 
one of nonintervention, which is the initial strategy in 99% of all third party-conflict-
years. Figure 1 also shows the frequency of different secondary policy choices. De-
escalatory strategies are the most common (42% of cases) choice after an initial effort 
concludes. Most third parties de-escalate to the point of exiting for management 
altogether, and verbal efforts are the only form of de-escalation that occurs, used in four 
cases. Choosing the same strategy occurs infrequently (18% of cases), and only following 
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diplomatic and verbal strategies. There is much more variation, however, in escalatory 
policy choices. Third parties follow initial techniques with verbal (56%), diplomatic 
(38%), economic (4%) and peacekeeping (2%) strategies. Thus, while the theoretical 
approach certainly has important implications for de-escalatory behavior in conflict 
management, much of the interesting variation in second effort policy choices occur in 
the decision to escalate. I therefore focus on escalation for reasons of both interest and 
empirical necessity. The next section explores when and why third parties change from 
their initial strategy to a more invasive one. 
A THEORY OF MANAGEMENT DECISIONS 
What explains escalations in conflict management policy? When and why do third 
parties change their response to a conflict to adopt a more invasive policy? While the 
answer to this question initially seems simply that the initial policy is not producing the 
desired result, further exploration of the management process reveals variation in policy 
escalations that incorporates more than policy failures. Third parties may meet their goals 
then adopt new policies. In addition, states must account for their own commitment to 
resolving the conflict and the level of involvement that is in their interests. I broadly 
categorize causes of escalation as (1) contextual factors, which provide background 
information and tell us about dispute salience to the third party, and (2) intervening 
events, which create pressure for change through shifts in environmental conditions or 
negative feedback.  
Contextual Factors and Escalation 
Contextual factors reveal information about the setting in which policymakers act, 
providing important background to policy decisions. Policy makers may be more immune 
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to pushes for escalation in some circumstances, as in the presence of Goldman’s (1988) 
stabilizers. According to Goldman, “stabilizers” that can inhibit change even in the 
presence of pressure for change. These variables, which include international, cognitive, 
political and administrative stabilizers, affect whether or not sources of change actually 
set change in motion.  
In conflict management settings, the strategic relationship between the third party 
and disputants provides important context to the foreign policy decision process. That 
state relationships (whether cooperative or conflicting) are often very stable across time, 
especially in the post-Cold War era (Wohlforth 1999), means they create a consistent 
setting in which policy makers decide upon management decisions. State relationships 
are an important contextual factor in policymaking since they provide information about 
how much the third party values conflict resolution (Melin 2011). State relationships 
include ties through alliances, trade and geography. Those states that share an alliance, 
trade with, or are geographically proximate to the disputants have strong ties to the actors 
involved. Strong third party ties to disputants encourage interveners to use employ any 
tools at their disposal to resolve the conflict, thereby encouraging policy escalation when 
necessary. Consider Germany’s involvement in the break up of Yugoslavia, wherein they 
continued efforts despite repeated failures.8 Since third parties with strong ties to the 
disputants are more likely to desire peaceful conflict resolution, these states are willing to 
employ multiple intervention strategies and escalate when necessary. Conversely, if 
policy makers do not place high value on settling the dispute in question, then it will not 																																																								
8 Germany has strong strategic, economic, religious ties to both Slovenia and Croatia, which encouraged its 
active engagement during the breakup of Yugoslavia. It was the first country to recognize Slovenia and 
Croatia in the European Community and remained engaged in the diplomatic and eventual military 
interventions. Germany’s involvement reflects a long time engagement in the country (Libal 1997), and 
some consider Germany to have been “Yugoslavia’s best diplomatic friend” (Nielsen 1999).  
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gain allocations of the actor’s limited resources (Goldmann 1988). As conflict 
management is not costless, third parties must have sufficient interests at stake in the 
conflict to voluntarily become involved in an already difficult situation (Powell 1993, 
Palmer 1990, Clark 2001). The strategic interests of the mediator are highlighted in the 
mediation literature in terms of bias (Melin 2011, Terris and Maoz 2005), credibility 
(Favretto 2009, Kydd 2007, Rauchhaus 2006), and interests (Terris and Maoz 2005), as 
well as affecting engagement (Beardsley 2010, Melin and Svensson 2009). 
Observable third party ties to disputants include the presence of alliances, trade 
interests and geographic proximity. Since conflicts involving allies threaten alliance 
partners, third parties have an interest in seeing these conflicts peacefully resolved (Melin 
2011). Economic ties have been shown to increase communication between states, 
creating shared identity and values and to increase international intervention in civil wars 
(Greig and Regan 2008). Geographically proximate states, which regularly interact with 
the disputants and will be disproportionately affected by a neighboring conflict, are more 
likely to engage in conflict management (Kathman 2010, 2011). Common interests and 
threats mean third parties are going to have a greater interest in seeing the conflicts that 
affect their allies resolved, making them more likely to escalate policies when necessary. 
We can therefore expect that: 
Hypothesis 1: Third parties with strong ties to the disputants are more likely to adopt 
escalating management policies. 
Intervening Factors and Change 
 Intervening factors are dynamic events that push for change, such as shocks and 
restructuring (Hermann 1990). In one of the classic works on foreign policy change, 
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Rosenau (1980) highlights the process of political adaptation to changes in the 
environment, writing that continuities and changes in policy are in response to internal 
developments and shifts in external circumstances. Policy makers adapt to changes in 
order to minimize costs and maximize opportunity for success. Later work by Goldmann 
(1988, 3-4), elaborates that while states “have a tendency to stick to their previous 
policies,” there is also pressure “to adapt to changing conditions in their environment.”  
 Within the conflict management environment, one important environmental 
change is policy feedback. The outcomes of past policies may create pressure for change 
or be stabilizing. While progress in past efforts encourages continued engagement, those 
that produce negative results create an atmosphere discouraging repeated attempts and 
increase third party exiting. Efforts that fail to produce any agreements or changes in 
disputant behavior do little to reward third party efforts and offer few incentives for 
future efforts.  
Within the mediation literature, previous management experiences has been 
shown to play an important role in third party involvement, regardless of the previous 
effort’s outcome (Rubin 1992, Bercovitch and Gartner 2006, Clayton and Gleditsch 2013, 
Greig 2005). Management efforts are not isolated events, as each incidence creates a 
history of the third party and disputant management experience.  On the disputant side, 
prior efforts establish rapport and signal a commitment to conflict management. Previous 
disputant experiences with mediation signals a disputant’s willingness to work with an 
outsider.  In this broader process, previous involvement encourages future, more engaged 
efforts.  
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Successfully accomplishing management goals is also likely to generate shifts in 
the nature of third party involvement. The third party can then set new goals and will 
revise its strategy in accordance with these goals. The likelihood that a third party 
escalates its policy in a conflict increases when some progress is being made yet not all 
issues are settled. These circumstances encourage the third party to remain involved since 
they now have a stake in the outcome and have seen some of their efforts come to fruition 
(Rosenau 1980). I therefore hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2: When previous management policies attain their goal, third parties are 
more likely to adopt escalating management policies. 
A second important environmental change involves shifting conflict dynamics. 
Increasing conflict severity, for example, provides additional sources of negative 
feedback and pressure for policy changes. The nature of the conflict in terms of intensity 
and potential for escalation plays an important role in mediation occurrence and 
outcomes (Richmond 1998). We know that as conflict severity increases, the additional 
costs encourage disputants to find a diplomatic solution (Regan and Stam 2000, Zartman 
2000, Greig 2001). We also know that disputants are responsive to conflict dynamics and 
battlefield events in agreeing to mediation (Greig 2013). In the words of economist John 
Maynard Keynes, “When my information changes, I alter my conclusions.” Since 
changing conflict dynamics are likely to create pressure for escalation, I expect:  
Hypothesis 3: When the conflict escalates, third parties are more likely to adopt 
escalating management policies. 
Understanding the nature of policy shifts requires that we consider the nature of 
previous policies. The decision to escalate is partially dependent upon the technique that 
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was previously employed, as some techniques are more costly or likely to require 
additional third party action than others. Variations in the costs of management 
techniques offer different signals of third party intentions, commitment, and likelihood of 
escalating. Whereas military, economic and diplomatic efforts may entail high third party 
costs, verbal efforts and strategic inaction are essentially costless and entail little or no 
commitment, as a state at most risks its rapport with other actors.  We can also 
distinguish verbal, economic and military efforts, which are unilateral in the sense that 
they do not require disputant cooperation, from diplomatic efforts, which are multilateral 
and require disputant cooperation. Based on the low level of sunk costs and the presence 
of many escalating policy options, we can expect to find that escalation is much more 
likely to follow less costly management efforts. Third parties with strong ties to both the 
disputants are willing to employ more costly methods of management (such as mediation 
and other diplomatic efforts) early in a conflict, whereas other third parties will either 
employ a low cost technique (such as calling for a ceasefire) or wait to act until the costs 
of involvement are lower (Melin 2011).  We should therefore observe third parties with 
strong ties to the disputants being more likely to escalate following a policy of non-
intervention. We can therefore expect to find: 
Hypothesis 4: When previous management policies include non-intervention or 
verbal efforts, third parties with strong ties to the disputants are more likely to adopt 
escalating management policies. 
Whereas policy failures and shifts in conflict dynamics provide an intermediate 
step in the form of intervening policy factors, the relationship establishes the setting for 
policy makers. Context conditions the effect that intervening factors can have on policy 
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change. Thus, background factors and intervening factors lead to the outcome of policy 
change (Holsti 1982, Hermann 1990). In the next section of the paper, I empirically test 
the hypotheses that state relationships, combined with policy failures, management 
history and conflict dynamics generate policy change. 
DATA, MEASUREMENT AND METHODS 
Quantitatively testing my hypotheses requires data that reflect my holistic 
approach- data containing information on the many ways that a third party can manage an 
international conflict. To test my theoretical argument, I examine conflicts coded in the 
Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes data (Maoz 2005), focusing on interventions in 
interstate conflicts rather than civil wars. It is likely that domestic sovereignty poses a 
barrier to entry causing a selection effect in civil wars: those who act despite domestic 
nature of conflict are more likely to be committed. In addition, civil wars likely face 
different barriers to settlement for example, they often involve ethnic conflicts, which are 
indivisible and harder to resolve (see Svensson 2007b). It is therefore logical to expect 
that civil disputes would have different trends in long–term management as policy 
changes. Grieg and Diehl (2012) show that civil conflicts have a greater propensity for 
repeat mediation than do interstate conflicts (6.4% of civil conflicts compared to 3.5% of 
international conflicts are mediated by the same mediator six or more times). 
The pool of potential conflict managers incorporates actors with varied 
affiliations, including those acting as independent individuals, under a state banner, and 
those with international and nongovernmental organizations. I focus my analysis on state-
sponsored mediation for both theoretical and empirical reasons. As states are both the 
dominant actors in world politics and the most frequent mediators, there are ample cases 
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to examine.  It is also likely that state interests differ from those of other third parties (see 
Melin, Gartner, and Bercovitch 2013 for a discussion on state-led mediation).  
Outcome Variable and Model Specification 
The processes that lead to escalation are not separate from the processes that 
encourage third parties to remain involved as a conflict manager beyond an initial 
management attempt. As Regan argues, the decision to act and which strategy to employ 
are inseparable (2000). The dependence in these actions creates challenges for 
econometric estimation, since third parties cannot escalate or change policies unless they 
opt to remain involved. As a conflict becomes more difficult to resolve and requires 
greater action from a third party, the likelihood of management occurring decreases. That 
third parties are likely to exit conflicts where they expect success is unlikely creates 
truncated data. Predicting escalation and de-escalation using logit estimation would result 
in biased estimates, as sample selection would result from merging those cases in which 
no future management attempt occurred and those in which the same management 
method was employed. Failing to account for these related political processes in a unified 
empirical model will lead to biased estimates and incorrect conclusions (Reed 2000). 
Using a statistical model to identify the presence and structure of sample selection 
requires first identifying the selection process (which states remain involved as 
managers?) and then modeling the outcome of interest (which states adopt new 
management policies?) (Manski 1995). Poorly identified selection models will likely be 
biased and inefficient, hypothesis tests are likely to be incorrect, and estimates of the 
outcome equation will also be biased (Brandt and Schneider 2007). 
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I estimate a censored probit model, which allows for the possibility of correlation 
in the equations’ errors, to account for the selection problem.9 The Heckman model has 
an exclusion restriction that requires unique regressors that only appear in the selection 
equation (Achen 1986). Similar to simultaneous equation models, covariates must be 
both good predictors of the selection variable and uncorrelated to/ with the errors in the 
final outcome (Greene 2003). In this case, the decision to remain involved as a conflict 
manager (or select into the sample) is closely related to the decisions to employ the same 
approach or adopt a new management method. A key assumption in selection modeling is 
the inclusion of a robust selection equation, since this predicts whether observations will 
be censored. Running the selection equation by itself (as a probit) reveals 99% of the 
cases are predicted correctly using the specification presented below.  
The first stage of the model predicts whether an initial Intervention occurs and a 
third party takes an action towards resolving the conflict, and the second stage examines 
when the third part escalates their management policy. Escalation takes place when a 
third party increases their intervention technique (see Table 1). This dichotomous 
measure assumes an increase in expenses and commitment from nonintervention to 
verbal, then diplomatic and administrative, followed by economic and military 
interventions (see Terris and Maoz 2005 for definitions and coding).10 Recurring 
intervention takes place in 190 efforts (third parties are involved in multiple management 
attempts in 62 percent of the 304 intervention cases). Third parties use the same 																																																								
9 It is theoretically possible that there are two different selection effects occurring: the selection of states 
that become involved and the selection of states that remain involved. However, I am not aware of a model 
that can model both processes simultaneously. And this is additionally complicated by the rarity of 
management events. I therefore focus on the first, and larger, selection effect: which states manage and the 
implications of this decision on escalation.  
10 Since non-intervention is a strategic foreign policy tool, it is included in the analyses presented below. 
Not taking any form of action can be a calculated response (Regan 2000). 
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management methods in 57 of the cases, which is reflective of the inertia that structural 
constraints models highlight, as power relations and institutional conditions may prevent 
a change from taking place. Policy changes from non-intervention or a less burdensome 
intervention strategy (such as shift from verbal efforts to diplomatic approaches) takes 
place in 128 (or 42 percent) of the recurrent intervention cases.  
Explanatory Variables: Measuring Third Party Ties 
I create an index of the strength of the ties among states as a measure of the nature 
of the third party’s relationship to each disputant. I employ the Alliance Treaty 
Obligations and Provisions data for information on if the third party has a defensive or 
offensive alliance with one or both states (Leeds et al. 2002), Barbieri’s (1996) 
international trade data for above average values of merchandise that the disputants 
import from the third party and the third party imports from the disputants11, and the 
Correlates of War Contiguity data (Stinnett et al. 2002) for the presence of shared land or 
water borders. Studies have shown links between geopolitical interests (Crescenzi et al. 
2012, Kathman 2011), trade (Crescenzi et al. 2005), alliances (Melin 2011) and third 
party management decisions.  This is an annual ratio of the sum of the third party’s ties 
(number of alliance, trade, and geographic ties) with a disputant to the sum of the third 
parties ties to all other disputants. This measure is used to capture the relative strength of 
this dyadic relationship to the third party’s relationship with other states in ongoing 
disputes. Once the score for each dyad is calculated, I capture the relative strength of ties 
with One-sided Ties, which includes third parties who have one tie that is greater than 
one standard deviation from its tie to the other disputant, No Ties, which includes third 																																																								
11 I dichotomize this variable by coding the presence of above average trade ties as one, and average or 
below average trade ties and 0. 
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parties that have no ties to the disputants, and Two-sided Ties (the comparison category), 
which includes third parties with ties that lie within a standard deviation of each other.  
Explanatory Variables: Measuring Policy Feedback 
 I expect that the failure of past policies to produce an agreement generates 
pressure to discontinue management efforts, whereas positive feedback should encourage 
third parties to remain involved and employ a variety of escalatory management 
techniques. 
Positive Feedback: This is a dichotomous measure of the short-term outcome at the time 
the previous effort ended. Assessment is made as to whether or not the primary goal of 
the intermediary intervention was achieved at the end of fourteen days, coded according 
to the Third Party Intervention data (see Frazier and Dixon 2006a).12 
Explanatory Variables: Measuring Conflict Dynamics 
 I hypothesize that changes in conflict dynamics should generate changes in 
management policy. More hostile conflict environments generate a different setting for 
interveners than to less hostile ones, and a post-conflict environment is substantially 
different from conflicts that have yet to escalate. 
Conflict Phase: This variable measures shifts in policy dynamics by looking at changes 
in the phase of the conflict when the intervention occurs. Three dummy variables are 
used to capture changes in the conflict phase: crisis, coded one when at the start of a 
crisis but prior to the escalation to military hostilities and zero otherwise, hostilities, 
coded one at the start of military hostilities and zero otherwise, and post-crisis, coded one 																																																								
12 To further explore the role of previous outcomes, I also tested a measure of outcomes a year after the end 
of the intervention. For example, if a mediation effort was to assist in negotiating a ceasefire and the 
mediation effort created a ceasefire that has been upheld for at least 12 months, this is considered a 
successful result. I find that evaluating the long-term outcome of the management effort has no effect on 
either the onset of intervention or escalation. 
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when the intervention began once the dispute is resolved and zero otherwise. The results 
are in comparison to pre-crisis circumstances (see Frazier and Dixon 2006a). 
Controls: Measuring Management Dynamics & Third Party Characteristics 
Level of previous involvement: This variable accounts for the mechanism used in the 
previous conflict management attempt, as those states with a history of more invasive 
previous techniques have fewer policies to which they can escalate (Frazier and Dixon 
2006a). Previous mechanisms include those summarized in Table 1. Previous verbal 
attempts are coded 1, diplomatic previous attempts are coded 2, economic are coded 3 
and peace operations are coded 4.  
Other third party successes: In the selection model, I also include a dichotomous 
measure, which may encourage additional management efforts (Frazier and Dixon 
2006a). Both this and the previous involvement measures offer ways to capture the 
dispute’s “importance” to would-be manager in understanding the decision to become 
involved, as strategic interests of the mediator have been shown to impact the decision to 
manage (Terris and Maoz 2005).  
Capabilities: Mediators with material capabilities can incentivize agreements through 
offering carrots that increase an agreement’s appeal or threatening sticks for failed 
compliance, thereby sustaining peace (Beardsley et al. 2006). States with abundant 
resources are also shown to be less constrained in their foreign policy choices as 
compared to those with few resources (Clark, Nordstrom, and Reed 2008, Siverson and 
Starr 1991). I therefore control for the third party’s Composite Index of National 
Capabilities (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). 
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Regional Power: Another mechanism for capturing third party leverage is to account for 
regional powers. Third parties that are regional powers are likely to not only have the 
capabilities necessary to wage an intervention but also are likely to have the interest to do 
so. “Power mediators” have been shown to be more successful in generating military 
settlements in civil wars (Svensson 2007c). This measures whether or not the third party 
is considered a regional power, according to the Correlates of War data (Stinnett et al. 
2002).  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 2 presents the results from censored probit models of escalation in 
management methods. 
***Table 2 Here*** 
The first column predicts intervention occurrence, and the second column is the 
predictions of escalation. The third and fourth columns test for interactive effects 
between success and ties. The model of intervention occurrence echoes much of what has 
been found in the management literature: third party relationships with the disputants 
(Melin 2011), management history (Greig 2005; Regan and Stam 2000) and third party 
power (or leverage, see Beardsley 2013) are important predictors of management activity. 
The coefficient for rho reflects the correlation in the errors in the selection and outcome 
equations. While it is extremely sensitive to model specification, the negative sign tells us 
that any component making selection more likely makes the outcome less likely.  
The first set of explanatory variables examines the role ties between the third 
party and disputant play, along with that of policy feedback. While I hypothesized that 
any ties will increase the likelihood of escalation, I find significant variation in those that 
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have ties to only one disputant compared to those with ties to both disputants. We 
observe in the first model that third parties with one-sided ties are more likely to 
intervene but less likely to escalate policies compared to third parties with ties to both 
disputants. Having ties to one disputant decreases the probability of escalation by 40%. In 
the model with interaction terms, the negative and significant relationship on the one-
sided ties coefficient tells us that those third parties with stronger ties to one state are 
50% less likely to escalate policies when their previous policy was not successful. The 
positive and significant interaction term between one-sided ties and success tells us third 
parties with stronger ties to one state are more likely (with a 2% increase in probability) 
to escalate policies when their previous policy was successful. A third party with stronger 
ties to one disputant is almost fifty percent less likely to escalate when its previous efforts 
have not been successful and twenty percent more likely to escalate when previous 
efforts were successful. The coefficient on no ties and the interaction between no ties and 
success is not statistically significant, which tells us there may be little relationship 
between escalation and state relationships when the third party does not have ties to either 
disputant, regardless of previous policy success. Interestingly, as revealed by the lack of 
significance for the success coefficient, previous policy success does not have an 
independent effect on policy escalation when the third party has ties to both states. This 
builds on findings within the mediation (Clayton and Gleditsch 2013) and conflict 
management literatures that it is not the outcome of previous management attempts but 
the presence of previous efforts that inform future efforts. 
 These results suggest that policy feedback and ties among the actors are 
influencing the decision to escalate conflict management policies. States with stronger 
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ties to one disputant (or biased states) are less likely to escalate when they have yet to 
accomplish the primary goal of their initial intervention. These same actors are more 
likely to select a more intrusive policy once those goals have been met. Together, these 
findings show that intermediaries with one-sided ties are responsive to policy feedback, 
waiting to first attain the goals of primary intervention efforts before escalating policies. 
Relationships and policy outcomes are less of a factor in circumstances that involve third 
parties without ties to either disputant or with ties to both disputants (or unbiased states). 
 Both models show that third parties are also responsive to shifting conflict 
dynamics. New policies are significantly more likely to be adopted when the conflict has 
recently become a crisis (2% increase in probability), has recent hostilities (3% increase 
in probability), or has been resolved (3% increase in probability). This likely reflects the 
need for new approaches that adopt to changes in the conflict environment. The dynamics 
of the conflict play an important role in a third party’s decision to adopt new management 
policies.13  
 Management dynamics also play a strong role in the decision to escalate in both 
models. The measure for level of previous involvement has a strong, negative 
relationship with policy escalation. Were the previous management effort an intervention 
that involved the military, the state is 99% more likely to escalate policies as compared to 
if the previous effort only involved verbal threats. This suggests, as I expected, that the 
																																																								
13 Since an overwhelming majority of the cases represent escalation from non-intervention, I reran the 
model defining escalation as a shift in active management strategies (excluding changes from non-
intervention). The results of the ties and policy feedback remained the same. The coefficients for the 
measures of conflict dynamics, however, became negative while remaining significant. This suggests that 
changing conflict dynamics encourage more active involvement if the third party did not previously 
intervene but that shifting dynamics discourage changes in management strategy if the third party was 
already actively managing the conflict. 
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more invasive and costly previous efforts at management were, the less likely a third 
party is to escalate policies.  
***Figure 2 Here*** 
 Figure 2 depicts the relationship between actor ties and escalation across various 
management histories. The graph highlights how the probability of escalation diminishes, 
reaching zero at efforts above diplomatic, as previous management efforts become more 
invasive. We also see that states with one-sided ties are generally less likely to escalate, 
but that the probability of escalation is much more divergent across state ties in 
management efforts following non-interventions and verbal efforts than in diplomatic 
efforts.  
To better assess the role previous management techniques play in decisions to 
escalate, I run separate models comparing disputes that experience escalation following 
previous verbal appeals, diplomatic efforts, and those that have no management history. 
This helps to prevent inaccurate conclusions based on the skewed management histories. 
Table 3 offers a closer look at how escalation trajectories differ across various 
management histories. 
***Table 3 Here*** 
 Interesting variation in escalation trajectories exists across the different 
management histories. It is first important to note that previous policies of non-
intervention make up an overwhelming majority of the cases, which highlights the 
necessity of examining results across management histories. Measures of policy feedback 
are omitted in the model of escalation after non-intervention, since there is no 
information about prior outcomes in these cases. With the exception of the now 
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significant coefficient for the absence of ties, the results in the non-intervention model are 
strikingly similar to those in the pooled model discussed above. It appears that states that 
intervene after having a policy of non-intervention are significantly less likely to escalate 
if they have one-sided ties or completely lack ties to the disputants in comparison to those 
third parties with strong ties to both disputants. Third parties that wait to manage a 
conflict are more likely to escalate to intervention if they have strong ties to both 
disputants. It appears that, when escalating from non-intervention, it is the strength of the 
ties managers have to the disputants (rather than their biases) that encourage escalation.  
 State relationships play a different role in escalation decisions after verbal and 
diplomatic attempts, however. One-sided ties encourage policy escalation after both 
verbal and diplomatic attempts, regardless of the outcome of the previous effort. When 
the previous effort was a verbal attempt, the lack of third party ties to either disputant 
actually slightly decreases the probability of escalation. Bias, it seems, plays a stronger 
role in the escalation decisions after verbal and diplomatic attempts. 
 There is also interesting variation in the role conflict dynamics play in policy 
escalation across the different management histories. Shifting conflict dynamics, 
measured with new crisis, hostilities, or post-crisis circumstances all strongly encourage 
policy escalation after non-intervention. States are much more likely to adopt a more 
intrusive policy if the conflict dynamics shift following a policy of non-intervention. This 
story is quite different in efforts that follow verbal and diplomatic attempts, however. A 
new crisis following a verbal attempt actually decreases the probability of escalation, 
while hostilities have negative but insignificant effect as well. A shift to a post-crisis 
environment, however, encourages escalation after verbal attempts as well. Conflict 
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dynamics appear to play little role in the escalation decisions following diplomatic 
efforts. 
The coefficient for rho remains significant across each model, reflecting the high 
correlation in the errors in the selection and outcome equations. Although sensitive to 
model specification, the negative sign tells us that any component making intervention 
more likely makes escalation less likely after non-interventions, whereas the positive 
signs tells us that circumstances encouraging intervention also encourage escalation after 
verbal and diplomatic attempts.  
CONCLUSION 
Third parties often make salient contributions to resolving international conflicts 
through generating significant shifts in the conflict environment. While third parties can 
create changes within the conflict, they also respond to these changes. The management 
process is therefore often an adaptive one, as third parties learn and adapt their policies to 
an ever-changing conflict environment.  In addition, however, third parties account for 
their ties to the disputants, as these ties set the stage for how all other information is 
processed. 
What factors explain a third party’s decision to escalate their strategy of conflict 
managing? This paper has argued that, while third parties respond to past failures and 
changes in the nature of the dispute, management decisions are also reflective of state 
relationships and previous techniques. States adopt changes according to policy feedback 
and shifting conflict dynamics. In addition, management changes reflect the strategic 
relationships between the third party and the disputants. I also show that a third party’s 
decision to escalate management policies relates to the previous management tools 
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employed, and that the effects of ties and conflict dynamics depend on this management 
history.  
In further exploring the role these factors play in the conflict management process, 
this paper opens the “black box” of conflict management, analyzing what happens 
between the start and end of third party involvement. I adopt an integrative definition of 
intervention, including various mechanisms of third party conflict management, thereby 
pushing beyond the challenges of foreign policy substitutability problematic in much of 
the conflict management literature. Since a third party’s willingness to try multiple 
intervention techniques reveals information about its commitment to resolving the 
conflict, understanding policy changes offers a mechanism of capturing third party intent 
and resolve. 
The findings here add an interesting new dimension to the vast literature on the 
role of state relationships and conflict management. The role of relationships in 
management activities has been a topic of great debate (Favretto 2009, Kydd 2007, 
Rauchhaus 2006). I further explore the role unsymmetrical ties and bias play in 
management through comparing the escalation of biased and unbiased management 
efforts. Ties can provide both the credibility (Terris and Maoz 2005) and bias (Favretto 
2005) that have been shown to play important roles in the decision to become involved. 
My finding that biased third parties are more likely to escalate following verbal and 
diplomatic attempts sheds further light on the finding that these third parties will be 
capable of pressuring the disputants to find a peaceful end to conflict (Svensson 2007a, 
Savun 2005). Biased third parties may not be successful only because they have leverage, 
but also because they are willing to implement multiple management tools. 
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Change and continuity are an integral part of the conflict management process. Much 
of the existing literature focuses on second attempts as trying the same method (as with 
the crude use of a “previous mediation” variable to capture interdependence between 
efforts, see Bercovitch and Gartner 2006 for a discussion) or as completely independent 
from the first (by adjusting standard errors to sustain this assumption, see Freedman 2006 
for a discussion). However, multiple interventions often involve changes in intervention 
strategy. As strategic actors, third parties carefully choose their management policies and 
consider their possible outcomes. The data employed within this research shows that third 
parties are not adopting escalatory management techniques solely in response to past 
failures. This paper seeks to build on the works of those exploring the importance of 
interdependence between conflict management efforts (Heldt 2009, Owsiak 2014). While 
these papers offer a glimpse into the dynamics of conflict management, important 
questions remain involving exiting, cycling between managers, and the implications for 
creating a durable peace. Although these questions are beyond the scope of this paper, 
they are important questions that will further our understanding of strategic assessment in 
conflict management policy choices.  
